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Introduction
Financial and economic crises and contagion are the subjects of a 
vast body of macroeconomic and fi nance research. Many recent 
interventions by national governments and multilateral institu-
tions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the European 
Central Bank, sought to stem the spread of contagion. In Septem-
ber 2008, motivated by concerns about a run on the banking 
sector, the Irish government provided a two-year guarantee for 
the debt and deposits of major Irish fi nancial institutions such as 
Anglo Irish Bank, AIB, Bank of Ireland, and several others. Major 
Irish banks, including Anglo Irish, had been experiencing deposit 
outfl ows and short-selling by institutional investors concerned 
about the spread of global fi nancial turmoil and the crisis in the 
Irish property market. At the time fi nancial regulators deemed it 
to be an illiquidity, not an insolvency, issue (Wall Street Journal, 
2010).2 The introduction of a government guarantee to the bank-
ing sector was expected to stem the confi dence crisis and signal 
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to capital markets a reduced chance of default, avoiding costly 
bank failures. The magnitude of the bad loan problem came to 
light in subsequent quarters. Amidst widening losses on prop-
erty loans, the Irish government nationalised Anglo Irish Bank 
and subsequently provided capital to the bank. The Irish govern-
ment formed the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), 
which took land and construction loans off bank balance sheets 
in an effort to shore up major banks.3 Over the next two years, the 
government would inject an estimated total of €46.3 billion into 
the banking system, including €29.3 billion into Anglo Irish Bank 
(Wall Street Journal, 2011). The costs of the bank sector rescue 
led Ireland to negotiate an ECB/IMF bailout. The fi nal tally of 
bailout costs is likely to be larger due to recessionary pressures 
stemming from fi scal austerity measures (Stiglitz, 2010a). 
Before assessing the effectiveness of interventions or designing 
a global fi nancial architecture that limits the spread of conta-
gion yet takes advantage of the benefi ts of integration, we need 
a rigorous understanding of the mechanisms behind crises and 
contagion. Below we provide a survey of the existing theories 
of fi nancial crises and contagion. We conclude by discussing 
the implications of contagion for economies with open capital 
markets, illustrated by recent global fi nancial crises in East Asia, 
the US and Ireland. 
Economic crises are defi ned as a sudden downturn in the level of 
economic activity, accompanied by an increase in unemployment 
rate and bankruptcies. Financial crises are typically associated 
with a sudden fall in the exchange rate or stock market prices. 
Banking crises are characterised by credit contraction, increase 
in defaults, and even bank runs and bankruptcies. Typically, 
the various crises are related (both temporally and causally): an 
economic crisis (whatever the cause) typically leads to a stock 
market downturn and a weakening of the exchange rate; and 
banking and fi nancial crises typically lead to economic crises.4
This survey is written from the vantage point of hindsight 
provided by the recent global fi nancial crises. Several earlier 
theories of crises provide little insight into that crisis, while other 
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explanations have proven to be more relevant. In any case, the 
recent global fi nancial turmoil provides a new lens through which 
one can see crises more generally. For instance, standard inter-
pretations of the East Asian crisis emphasised weak institutions 
and a lack of transparency, and suggested American institutions 
as an alternative model, which presumably would reduce, if not 
eliminate, the incidence of crises. We now realise that whatever is 
meant by ‘transparency’ and ‘good institutions’ is more compli-
cated than was widely thought at the time; in particular, it became 
evident that there were major defi ciencies in governance and in 
transparency in American fi nancial institutions, both the private 
institutions and the public ones that were supposed to regulate 
them. While some commentators had predicted a crisis, based 
on persistent global imbalances, the recent fi nancial crises in the 
US and Ireland were not caused by those imbalances, but at least 
precipitated by the bursting of the housing bubble. For years 
the Celtic Tiger growth had been backed by solid fundamen-
tals, including investments in infrastructure and human capital, 
and productivity growth. Like the US and many other markets, 
Ireland also witnessed a property boom facilitated by low interest 
rates and easy access to bank loans. As long as investors pursued 
leveraged bets on the real estate sector, helping to sustain the 
growth in residential and commercial property prices, default 
rates on loans remained low. Consequently, banks enjoyed rising 
equity valuations and low yield spreads. However, as interest 
rates increased and investor sentiment weakened with the onset 
of the global fi nancial crisis, the property market collapsed, bank 
loan losses mounted and major banks became undercapitalised.
Standard models based on previous crises attempting to 
predict vulnerability to crises would have suggested that the US 
and Western Europe were not vulnerable. This is, in a sense, in 
keeping with the long tradition of crises, where each crisis seems 
attributable to factors that were not singled out as ‘explaining’ 
the previous. Indeed, according to the conventional wisdom, 
where fl awed macroeconomic and monetary policies were often 
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cited as playing a key role in the generation of crises, the US and 
Europe were given high marks. 
There is a large literature on crises and contagion. This survey 
focuses on the theory, and in particular on how to reconcile crises 
with standard neoclassical theory and macroeconomics. Crises 
present a number of puzzles for standard economic theory. 
While some of the models discussed below resolve some of these 
puzzles, none to date does so in a fully satisfactory way, or at 
least in a way which is consistent with much of prevailing fi nance 
and macroeconomics: 
• A distinguishing feature of most fi nancial crises is a sudden 
change in the exchange rate. While outside observers may 
have expressed continuing worries, say about an overvalued 
exchange rate, the exchange rate adjustment process does not 
appear to work smoothly (in contrast to standard forward-
looking models with rational expectations, where individuals 
gradually revise expectations in light of the steady infl ow of 
information; typically, there is no new information of a magni-
tude that should have led to a readjustment of exchange rates 
of the magnitudes observed). This is an example of the more 
general puzzle of crises: large changes in outcomes that seem 
incommensurate with the scale of changes in the underlying 
state variables (see Stiglitz, 2011; United Nations, 2010).
• Standard models suggest that diversifi cation – the spreading 
of risk around the world – should have led to a more stable 
economic system. The 2008 crisis suggested the contrary: 
diversifi cation helped spread the crisis. There is a growing 
consensus that diversifi cation may reduce the exposure to 
small crises, but increase that to larger ones. As more coun-
tries liberalised their capital markets, global capital and 
interbank linkages became more prevalent. Countries around 
the world experienced spill-overs from the US fi nancial crisis. 
Irish banks had relied heavily on global interbank loans prior 
to the crisis. When short-term interbank lending froze up in 
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the third quarter of 2008 Irish banks faced signifi cant funding 
constraints.
• Conventional theories imply that even in markets where there 
is some irrationality, all that is required to make markets work 
well (to make markets reasonably stable and effi cient) is that 
there be enough (and enough may be a relative notion) rational 
market participants.5 The empirical evidence (buttressed by 
this crisis) is that rational participants exploiting the irration-
ality of others may make the markets highly volatile. 
• After the crisis there is a focus on contagion – on how inter-
dependence can lead a crisis to move from one country to 
another; but before the crisis there is an emphasis on the 
benefi ts of diversifi cation, on how interdependence enhances 
stability. None of the prevailing models integrates coherently 
these opposite forces (with the exception of Stiglitz, 2010b, 
2010c). 
• Policy frameworks have been equally incoherent. The standard 
response to contagious diseases is quarantine – the equivalent 
of capital controls. But many in the international community 
have resisted the imposition of capital controls, even in the 
event of a crisis.
• Policy decisions have often entailed interventions in the market 
that are announced to be (or believed to be) temporary, but 
it is argued that they will have long-run effects, shifting the 
equilibrium in the countries suffering from contagion. Why 
such temporary interventions would have long-run effects is 
often not clear (Stiglitz, 1999a).
A central thesis of this survey is that understanding crises requires 
an understanding of market imperfections – and especially of the 
constraints, for instance, on borrowing, imposed by imperfect 
information – and how those market imperfections interact with 
irrationalities on the part of market participants and imperfec-
tions in the regulatory environment.
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In the discussion below, we follow the literature on crises 
through its various stages, motivated by the series of crises the 
world has experienced in the last three decades. In retrospect, 
however, there is a basic taxonomy: 
• Models in which the shock giving rise to the crisis is exog-
enous, and those in which it is endogenous 
• Models in which markets are fully rational, and those in which 
they are not 
• Models in which there are multiple momentary equilibria, and 
models in which there is a unique momentary equilibrium
• Models in which there is a unique steady state (long-run) 
equilibrium, and models in which there are multiple long-run 
equilibria
The logic of crises is simple: if there are multiple momentary 
equilibria then the economy can suddenly switch from one to the 
other without any large change in any state variable (other than 
beliefs, which themselves are treated as state variables). If there 
are multiple steady state equilibria then a shock to the state vari-
ables of the economy (whether endogenous or exogenous) can 
act as a tipping point, bringing the economy into a different ‘orbit 
of attraction’. 
So too, the mathematics of crises is simple: under the convex-
ity assumptions made in most economic models diversifi cation 
spreads risks and reduces its impact. But, as Stiglitz (2010b, 2010c) 
points out, non-convexities are pervasive (bankruptcy, learn-
ing, etc.), and with non-convexities diversifi cation can amplify 
systemic risk.
This paper is divided into three sections. The fi rst surveys the 
literature on what causes crises; the second on contagion and 
the effect of interdependence in amplifying crises; the third on 
the role of government. Not surprisingly, theories which stress 
the effi ciency and stability of markets look to government as the 
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source of the problem; stability is attained by government not 
interfering in the natural workings of the market. Theories which 
see the economy as inherently ineffi cient and unstable look to 
government to help correct market failures.
Ascertaining which of these theories is correct is not easy, and 
beyond the task of this short survey. One of the reasons for the 
diffi culties is that there are elements of many of the alternative 
approaches present in every crisis. No one could look at the reces-
sion of 2008 or the Irish banking crisis without noting market 
irrationalities. But does that mean we could not have had a crisis 
in the absence of such irrationalities? The major shock was an 
endogenous one – a housing bubble; the shock was not an exog-
enous event (‘a once in a hundred year fl ood’) but there were 
exogenous (at least to the economic system) events that perhaps 
could have triggered a major downturn, refl ected in the spike in 
oil and food prices.
What Causes Financial Crises?
The earliest approaches to the onset of currency and fi nancial 
crises – the fi rst generation of crisis models – focused on funda-
mental macroeconomic imbalances and adherence to a monetary 
policy incompatible with the maintenance of an exchange rate 
peg (for example, Krugman, 1979).6 
The 1994–1995 Mexican crisis led policy makers to ask what 
accounted for the sudden onset of a market panic. Although 
fundamental macroeconomic problems, including overvalued 
exchange rates, current account defi cits and rising short-term 
foreign currency government debt, were present, the peso’s 
devaluation alone did not quickly stem the crisis.7 The crisis (like 
many before it) posed several questions: (a) why did it occur 
when it did? The fundamental imbalances had long been recog-
nised. (b) The large immediate fall in the exchange rate, which 
many thought should have equilibrated the market – leading to 
what might be viewed as an equilibrium exchange rate – didn’t 
stem the crisis. Why not?
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The peso crisis led researchers to turn their attention to infor-
mation fl ows and trader behaviour around market panics, which 
formed the second generation of theories of currency crises (for 
example, Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996); and Agenor and 
Masson (1999); and more informal discussions by Furman and 
Stiglitz (1998); and Stiglitz (2010b)). 
Multiple Equilibria 
The ‘second generation’ literature explored one possible expla-
nation for the sudden large change in the exchange rate (beyond 
what can be explained by changes in the shocks to the economy, 
including new information) and the failure of the exchange rate 
to equilibrate. 
The peso crisis precipitated a massive loss of confi dence in the 
currency and a full-on market panic. Though the importance of 
confi dence is often mentioned, traditional macro models do not 
include independent variables that quantify confi dence. Those 
that have tried to do so show that confi dence can have signifi cant 
explanatory powers, but few models incorporate confi dence in a 
formal way. 
One way of doing so is to assume that there are multiple equi-
libria.8 Models of multiple equilibria (sunspots) that formally 
incorporated ‘confi dence’ suggest that a change in confi dence 
can move the economy from one equilibrium to another. In the 
case of debt crises, Brazil (and perhaps Greece) provide exam-
ples: with low interest rates the country can easily service the 
debt, so it is rational that interest rates are low; but if interest 
rates become high the country cannot service the debt, and it is 
rational that the interest rate is high to compensate for the risk of 
default (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2003).The idea of a self-fulfi ll-
ing market panic originated in the context of a run on a bank. 
In Diamond and Dybvig (1983), banks have relatively illiquid 
assets; in other words, if a bank has to sell assets on short notice 
it sacrifi ces a part of the asset value in the process. Every period 
some customers withdraw money from the bank to meet their 
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spending needs. In a perfect world, all others keep their money 
in the bank. However, customers are aware that withdrawals 
will not be honoured if the bank runs out of money (no deposit 
insurance scheme exists). As they observe other customers’ with-
drawals they could decide to take their own money out as well 
in anticipation of a bank run. Such self-fulfi lling panics can leave 
everybody worse off. 
Market Frictions
A third generation of models of crises focused on how various 
market frictions contribute to the onset of a fi nancial crisis, ampli-
fying (rather than dampening) shocks (for example, Kiyotaki and 
Moore, 1997; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2001; and Mendoza, 
2010) Moreover, in these models what would normally be equili-
brating adjustments to the shocks can be destabilising. While the 
importance attributed to specifi c fi nancial frictions varies from 
model to model, a common theme in these theories of fi nancial 
crises is the role of market imperfections in explaining both the 
fast pace of diffusion and the large extent of amplifi cation of 
negative economic shocks, providing a recipe for a sudden crash. 
Market frictions (information asymmetries, costly state veri-
fi cation, costs of contract enforcement, and bankruptcy (see 
Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993a)) limit the extent to which fi rms 
can use equity or hedging contracts.9 As a result, fi rms have to 
rely on debt, while remaining exposed to risk, and fi rms act in a 
risk-averse manner.10 Optimal fi nancial structures lead effectively 
to constraints on debt–equity ratios, so that a decrease in fi rm 
equity reduces its ability to borrow. The macroeconomic conse-
quences of these micro imperfections are severe, with investment 
(including inventory accumulation), for instance, expanding in 
booms by a multiple of the change in equity (the fi nancial accel-
erator), and the converse happening in downturns (for example, 
Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993a; Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 
1996). Not only are the effects of shocks amplifi ed, but they can 
persist over time.
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Other imperfections in fi nancial markets can similarly trig-
ger crises. Many borrowers face collateral constraints that limit 
borrowing capacity. Contract enforcement is complicated and 
lenders have only partial information. A collateral requirement 
can act both as a selection and incentive device (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1986) and can help manage default risk. For example, in 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) creditors cannot force repayment or 
seize the borrower’s human capital, so borrowers can strategi-
cally default on the debt. Collateral-based borrowing constraints 
tied to the value of the fi rm’s real assets become necessary.11 
As a result, the maximum amount of debt the fi rm can take on, 
assuming collateral of a given value, is limited. Even a temporary 
shock to the value of collateral translates into reduced borrowing 
ability. As a result, a shock sets in motion a feedback effect that 
decreases investment and the rate of growth for several years. 
Credit-constrained fi rms are forced to reduce investment, result-
ing in further declines in net worth, which in turn lead to tighter 
borrowing constraints and additional investment cuts. 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993a) explain how with unindexed 
debt contracts a macroeconomic shock (e.g. monetary policy 
tightening) that leads to lower than expected prices results in 
decreased equity, with real effects that are amplifi ed by the fi nan-
cial accelerator. Non-convexities in the relationship between 
equity and investment also imply that a distributional shock (e.g. 
an increase in the price of oil) has macroeconomic consequences, 
with the contraction in the losing sector exceeding the expansion 
in the benefi ting sector.12 These fi nancial constraints cause one-
time shocks to persist and result in widespread insolvencies.
The banking system itself can amplify especially large down-
turns. Banks can be viewed as highly leveraged fi rms (Greenwald 
and Stiglitz, 2003), so that when their equity is diminished they 
reduce their lending. Institutional features and regulatory design 
can increase the extent to which this is prevalent. Excessive reli-
ance on capital adequacy requirements can result in a built-in 
destabiliser; countercyclical prudential regulations or appropri-
ately designed policies of regulatory forbearance may be able to 
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offset the effects (see Helmann, Murdoch and Stiglitz (2000) and 
the various essays in Griffi th-Jones, Ocampo and Stiglitz (2010)). 
Regulation of maturity and currency mismatches in banks and 
the fi rms to which they lend can reduce the vulnerability of the 
banking system – and thereby the economy – to shocks.
During the Irish fi nancial crisis, property developers facing 
declining real estate valuations were unable to refi nance exist-
ing loans or obtain new loans. Asset write downs resulting from 
losses on property loans constrained the banks’ ability to raise 
new fi nancing, in turn limiting loan provision. Business and 
consumer credit reductions exerted downward pressure on the 
rate of new investment and consumption growth. 
Other institutional rules and policies (in both home and 
foreign countries), such as the weakening of automatic stabilisers 
(for example, safety nets), can make countries more sensitive to 
shocks. Delegating authority of risk evaluation to rating agen-
cies and imposing constraints on what pensions can invest in can 
contribute to volatility – a sharp downgrade by the rating agen-
cies (as happened in Thailand in 1997) can precipitate a crisis (see 
Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz, 1999). In Ireland and other GIIPS (Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) countries, downgrades of 
sovereign and bank credit ratings limited their capital market 
access, causing a credit contraction and exacerbating recession-
ary pressures.
Systemic Crises 
In the third generation models just described, fi nancial 
constraints (operating through collateral requirements, debt–
equity constraints or real balance effects), especially in the context 
of imperfectly indexed debt contracts, can lead to the amplifi -
cation and persistence of shocks. While research on systemic 
shocks began well before the Great Recession, the recession has 
enhanced impetus for this work (see, for example, Haldane, 2009; 
and Haldane and May, 2011). Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003) and 
Allen and Gale (2000) describe bankruptcy cascades – how the 
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bankruptcy of one fi rm can lead to that of others. The extent to 
which this occurs depends on fi nancial interdependence. Pecuni-
ary externalities arising in the presence of incomplete risk markets 
and imperfect information imply that the set of privately profi t-
able contracts will not in general be socially optimal (Greenwald 
and Stiglitz, 1986). In fact, managerial contracts implicitly based 
on relative performance can lead to excessively correlated risk 
taking (Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983). Moreover, there are strong 
incentives especially for large banks to become excessively inter-
dependent and correlated, so that in bad outcomes they will be 
bailed out (Stiglitz, 2010a; Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008; etc.).
Market and Individual Irrationalities
In the original Diamond–Dybvig (1983) model, customers have 
no information about the bank’s default risk. In real life, some 
depositors could have information about the bank’s fi nancial 
health. However, even when customers are able to assess the 
bank’s fi nancial condition they sometimes end up ignoring their 
private knowledge and copying the actions of others, which is 
known as herding (see, for example, Banerjee, 1992; and Bikh-
chandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992). As a result, bank runs or 
sudden market crashes can occur even when only a few investors 
or depositors possess negative information. Such herding may be 
rational. 
In addition to the rational reasons for herding, many have 
argued that irrationality plays a crucial role in both the onset and 
the creation of the conditions for and the spread of fi nancial crises 
(for example, Stiglitz, 1999b, 2004; and Hirshleifer and Teoh, 
2009). For instance, as Kindleberger, Aliber and Solow (2005) 
note, changes in the sentiment of borrowers and creditors over 
time can explain the well-known cyclical nature of bank lending. 
(Such changes in sentiment also play an important role in Minsky 
cycles and credit crises.) Increases in loan supply can be attrib-
uted to optimism in good times, while decreases in credit can be 
linked to pessimism in bad times. Irrational investor pessimism 
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causes rapid declines in lending, asset prices and exchange rates, 
typically seen during crises. Investor irrationality can stem from 
the inability to correctly process available data, compounded by 
behavioural biases that cause investors to make suboptimal deci-
sions based on the beliefs they have formed (see Barberis and 
Thaler (2003) for a detailed survey).13 The resulting overreaction 
to economic news can cause small negative shocks to trigger 
large-scale market panics that spread across national borders.
When bubbles break (or when panics lead to irrationally 
depressed prices) there are large real balance effects and the other 
effects delineated above arising from the fi nancial accelerator, 
and these can give rise to a macroeconomic crisis. The devastat-
ing consequences of a burst housing market bubble have been 
seen in the recent US and Irish fi nancial crises.
In open economies with fi rms that have substantial foreign 
currency debt (with mismatches in the currency and maturity 
structure of assets and liabilities), large changes in exchange rates 
similarly can have dramatic effects on equity values or lead to 
large increases in collateral requirements, precipitating a crisis, 
for instance, as fi rms make large cutbacks in investment. During 
the 1997–1998 Asian fi nancial crisis, fi rms with foreign currency 
liabilities and home currency assets were vulnerable to deprecia-
tion of the home currency (Stiglitz, 2001; Cespedes, Chang and 
Velasco, 2004). 
In standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models the 
sources of crises are exogenous shocks, but the most important 
crises involve the breaking of bubbles, most of which can be attrib-
uted to internal market dynamics. Housing prices, for instance, 
rise to the point where further increases are not sustainable 
given the constraints imposed by the institutional and regulatory 
system (even with mild forbearance). When home prices can no 
longer increase at the rate that has been anticipated demand for 
housing decreases suddenly with the follow-on effects described 
above. This pattern, repeated historically, presents a challenge 
to rational expectations models. There are two possibilities. One 
is that with short-sighted market participants the economy can 
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evolve in a manner that is consistent with inter-temporal arbi-
trage equations for a very long time, before a (say, non-negativity) 
constraint becomes binding (e.g. Shell and Stiglitz, 1967). The 
other is that there is uncertainty about the date of unravelling 
of the process, and a bubble can then be consistent with rational 
expectations for an extended period of time (Abreu and Brun-
nermeier, 2003). 
We suspect though that it is challenging to fully recon-
cile bubbles with perfect rationality. In the US, Irish and most 
other bubbles (Gurdgiev, Lucey, Mac an Bhaird and Roche-
Kelly (2011) discuss the Irish property bubble) large numbers of 
investors recognised that there was a very high probability of a 
bubble (and took short bets), even if others believed it was not 
the case. The question is, why couldn’t those who knew better 
correct the market irrationality? Note that the analysis of such 
situations requires the construction of models in which individu-
als have different beliefs, and even as they extract information 
from the market they do not converge to the same beliefs. Recent 
models focusing on the consequences of short sale restrictions for 
asset bubbles have provided insights, since those who are more 
optimistic are given more weight during booms than during 
recessions (e.g. Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003). This gives rise to 
higher market volatility, with real consequences of the kind that 
we noted earlier in this essay. 
In practice, delineating rational and irrational causes of crises 
can be hard not only because investors face imperfect markets, 
but also because rationality and irrationality interact: there are 
rational actors willing to exploit the irrationality of others (and 
imperfections in the regulatory framework). While standard 
models assume that such rational exploitation of market irration-
ality stabilises the economy, in fact that often does not seem to 
be the case. The crisis of 2008 serves as an example. The lending 
during the housing bubble illustrates a high level of irrationality 
on the part of market participants. Incentive distortions led to 
excessive risk taking in mortgage provision. In the end, it was 
rational for major institutions to make contracts with each other 
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which amplifi ed risks and made them less transparent, because 
it ensured (under the assumption of too-big-to fail) large and 
sustained government subsidies. 
Destabilising Market Processes 
The collapse of the exchange rate may restore the market equi-
librium (by increasing exports and reducing imports) but it may 
sometimes have the opposite effect on the economy. If domes-
tic fi rms have foreign currency denominated debt the change 
in exchange rates has large real balance effects (Greenwald 
and Stiglitz, 1993a), which leads to large changes in behaviour 
– production, investment, inventory holdings, etc. – and can 
precipitate an economic downturn. It affects the ability to repay 
loans, and that in turn affects banks’ ability to lend. Limited access 
to credit and weak balance sheets impede the normal foreign 
exchange adjustment mechanism. A decline in the exchange rate 
can weaken aggregate demand and exacerbate the downturn.14
This is but one example of how economic processes that in 
simplistic models help the economy equilibrate may, in more 
realistic models, have just the opposite effect. In a recession, wage 
and price declines weaken aggregate demand, exacerbating the 
gap between supply and demand and the economic downturn.15
Trend Reinforcement and ‘Orbits of Attraction’
Battiston, Delli Gatti, Greenwald and Stiglitz (2007) describe 
a variety of other destabilising circumstances where there is a 
process of trend reinforcement, that is, a negative shock is followed 
by consequences that worsen the fi rm’s (or the economy’s) future 
prospects. Consider the evolution of a fi rm’s net worth as a 
stochastic process. A negative shock increases the likelihood that 
the fi rm will go bankrupt (reach the zero boundary at an earlier 
date), but that means that lenders will demand higher interest 
rates, increasing the pace at which a fi rm with negative drift 
moves downward. 
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There can exist a range of state variables (here, net worth) 
such that in one set of conditions the fi rm (economy) converges 
to bankruptcy (crisis), while in another it does not. Shocks can 
move the economy from one ‘orbit of attraction’ to another. 
How Crises Spread
We have provided a brief and by no means exhaustive overview 
of fi nance and macroeconomics research into the causes of fi nan-
cial crises. As Stiglitz (2010b) notes, the mechanisms behind shock 
amplifi cation can help explain not only the onset of crises but also 
the spread of crises across countries. As countries remove restric-
tions on international capital fl ows crises that arise when small 
shocks snowball due to market frictions increasingly involve 
multiple economies. In today’s global fi nancial and banking 
marketplace, the issue of propagation of shocks and crises across 
countries is arguably of predominant importance. Therefore, we 
next turn to the role of contagion16 and other factors contributing 
to the spread of fi nancial crises. 
It should be obvious that substantial trade or capital linkages 
can contribute to the spread of crises. But that does not mean that 
the linkages exacerbate crises. They may dampen the crisis in 
one country, while at the same time bringing about a downturn 
in another. Had the US not exported so many of its securitised 
mortgages leading up to the recent crisis arguably the US crisis 
would have been worse. In standard models, however, the global 
aggregative effect is reduced through interdependence. The 
worry, however, is that fi nancial interdependence leads to the 
opposite effect, in a process which is called contagion, by analogy 
to the spread of disease, where interaction amplifi es the overall 
incidence of the disease. 
Of course, even if diversifi cation leads to better overall global 
economic performance, countries may worry about their own 
exposure to risks. The last section explained how, as a result of 
fi nancial constraints, economic systems may amplify shocks; and 
the costs of offsetting and managing risks may be signifi cant, and 
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not worth the benefi ts of increased integration. Stiglitz (2006) has, 
for instance, discussed the high costs associated with reserves 
that countries maintain to enable them to better manage the 
shocks that they face.
Financial linkages can take on several forms: 
• A reduction in foreign direct investment, as a result of either 
fi nancial constraints in the investing country or in the markets 
for which the goods to be produced are destined 
• A decrease in fi nancial infl ows, not adequately offset by 
actions of domestic monetary authorities, that leads to fi nan-
cial constraints and/or higher cost of capital 
• A reversal of fi nancial fl ows – from infl ows to outfl ows – which 
typically is associated with large changes in exchange rates 
While these changes in exchange rates would, in the standard 
trade models, enhance aggregate demand through an increase 
in net exports, balance sheet effects (especially important when 
debt is denominated in foreign currencies) often dominate. More-
over, the changes in fi nancial fl ows can be motivated either by 
changes in information or beliefs (investors suddenly realise that 
the risk of investing in foreign countries is greater than they had 
previously believed), by changes in fi nancial constraints or by 
real shocks amplifi ed through fi nancial constraints. The fi nancial 
constraints can arise from regulation or institutional/informa-
tional imperfections. Finally, investor actions can bring about a 
correlated onset of crises, if investors update their views about 
the likelihood of a crisis based on witnessing a crisis in another 
market or if investors (including banks) have exposure to several 
different markets through their portfolios. 
One example of what is sometimes called ‘pure contagion’ 
involves investors fl eeing a country after observing a crisis in 
another economy that has no trade or capital ties to the original 
economy. The idea that investors can infer an economy’s pros-
pects from crises in other economies is central to the information 
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contagion view (Chen, 1999; King and Wadhwani, 1990; etc.) 
Intuitively, falling asset prices in one market can convey infor-
mation about the value of securities in other markets if the two 
markets share some common risks.17 Imperfectly informed inves-
tors learn about the odds of a crisis in their economy by observing 
crisis episodes overseas. 
The caveat about investor rationality applies here as well. The 
explanations above focused on rational investors. Often at least 
some degree of irrationality is involved in investor panics. If 
investors overreact to news or make other mistakes when draw-
ing inference from other crises, contagion can spread faster as a 
result of investor irrationality. Even if investors do not perceive 
a dramatic shift in risk, an expectation that other investors will 
update their beliefs about risk may be suffi cient to spur a sell-off. 
The channels through which pure contagion exerts its effects 
are all of those described in the previous section, including the 
impact of prices (especially through fi re sales) on borrowing 
constraints and real balances. 
Several studies focus on the role of direct fi nancial linkages 
in shock diffusion. Financial linkages can take the form of risk-
sharing arrangements or balance sheet exposure to distressed 
countries or fi nancial institutions. In a series of papers, Battiston 
et al. (2007), Gallegati, Greenwald, Richiardi and Stiglitz (2008), 
and Stiglitz (2010b, 2010c) ask when will it be the case that such 
risk-sharing arrangements exacerbate rather than reduce systemic 
risk. Gallegati et al. (2008) model diffusion of shocks among 
interlinked fi nancial institutions. (Linkages can be, for example, 
viewed as loans extended to other banks.) Interbank loans allow 
individual banks to diversify away idiosyncratic shocks to their 
loan portfolios, reducing the likelihood of failures. However, 
when economic tides turn, bank failures are more likely to be 
systemic in nature if banks are interconnected. Moreover, bank 
managers who have incentive confl icts or who do not fully inter-
nalise the spill-overs of bank failures tend to establish too many 
interbank links. 
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Several other papers explain how the interconnectedness of 
bank balance sheets can facilitate the spread of shocks affecting 
an individual bank to other fi nancial institutions. Allen and Gale 
(2000) provide a model of balance sheet contagion in the bank-
ing sector. Contagion occurs due to overlapping claims between 
different banks. Liquidity shocks to one bank lead to losses at 
other banks in the economy because their claims on the troubled 
bank decline in value. This channel can augment the effects of 
relatively small shocks and lead to contagion and fi nancial fragil-
ity in the banking system. Wagner (2010) similarly concludes 
that banks motivated by the diversifi cation of idiosyncratic risk 
can contribute to systemic risk. Haldane (2009) shows that these 
interlinkages may reduce the risk of failure when there are small 
or uncorrelated shocks, but increase the risk of failure when there 
are large and correlated shocks. 
The analysis of the consequences of fi nancial linkages across 
countries is, in many ways, parallel to that of interlinkages among 
banks (or banks and fi rms) within a country (Greenwald and 
Stiglitz, 2003; Stiglitz, 2010c). In the international fi nance setting, 
capital fl ows between countries can serve as a similar risk-sharing 
mechanism (Stiglitz, 2010b). Capital market integration allows 
individual countries to smooth country-specifi c shocks to output. 
Assuming a high level of country-specifi c risk and a cost of such 
variability to consumers, risk sharing through international capi-
tal fl ows is benefi cial. On the fl ipside, a major adverse event that 
affects a single economy has the potential to cause a systemic fail-
ure in all economies interlinked through capital markets.
The underlying intuition behind these seemingly perverse 
results is that in the presence of non-convexities risk sharing may 
lower expected returns. Non-convexities are pervasive – they 
arise whenever there are information constraints, bankruptcy 
costs or learning processes.18 The process of trend reinforcement 
described earlier implicitly entails a non-convexity. In that model, 
with a negative drift to the stochastic process when equity falls 
below a critical level, increases in risk increase the chance that the 
fi rm escapes the death trap. 
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Cross-border fi nancial fl ows may exacerbate fi nancial 
constraints, and therefore increase the magnitude of the global 
consequences of shocks and imply that much of the burden of a 
shock to a given country is experienced by countries with which 
it is fi nancially integrated. For instance, creditors may impose 
more stringent collateral requirements on foreign borrowers 
because of the greater information asymmetries. In Caballero 
and Krishnamurthy (2001) contractual distortions in the treat-
ment of domestic and international collateral can induce fi re sales 
(presumably that are worse than those that would have arisen 
if cross-border lending was limited), resulting in liquidation of 
assets at a signifi cant discount in the event of a shock. In a related 
vein, in Mendoza (2010) information costs, high leverage and 
borrowing constraints combine to cause fi re sales. Traders facing 
high debt levels and borrowing constraints can be forced into 
fi re sales of assets to less informed foreign buyers, even though 
the shock is only temporary. Such fi re sales can precipitate rapid 
shutdowns of external capital markets (i.e. countries facing these 
fi re sales lose access to foreign funds) and large consumption 
contractions.19 Stiglitz (2002) described how these effects served 
to deepen the East Asia crisis of 1997–1998.
The spread of crises to economies that have the same creditors 
or investors (such as global banks or hedge funds) as the econ-
omy in crisis constitutes another channel for the transmission of 
shocks. Creditors or investors that suffered losses in a crisis in 
one economy are likely to modify their lending or investment 
strategy with respect to seemingly unrelated economies. When 
banks face loan defaults, they are likely to scale back lending to 
all borrowers, even those unaffected by the initial adverse event, 
due to capital requirements or balance sheet effects. The worse 
the effect of defaults on the bank’s fi nancial health and ability to 
raise equity, the more pronounced the cutbacks in lending to other 
borrowers. Because of information asymmetries, lending cuts 
may be disproportionately large for foreign borrowers. Chava 
and Purnanandam (2011) fi nd empirical support for the role 
of lender portfolios in the transmission of shocks to previously 
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unaffected fi rms in a study of borrowers dependent on bank debt 
around the 1998 Russian fi nancial crisis. Rashid (2011) similarly 
fi nds that foreign banks play an important role in the transmis-
sion of shocks across borders. 
Similarly, investors who lose money in one market might liqui-
date their positions in other economies (to cover losses or meet 
margin requirements). Shocks, therefore, can be transmitted as a 
result of portfolio rebalancing by investors with stakes in multi-
ple markets (Kodres and Pritsker, 2002). Investors are expected 
to respond to shocks that affect a given market by modifying 
portfolio exposures to shared macroeconomic risk factors. Such 
cross-market linkages are likely to spread shocks faster during 
bad times and in the presence of high levels of foreign debt, 
as was the case for emerging economies in the Asian fi nancial 
crisis. But even if there are no shared macroeconomic risks glob-
ally diversifi ed investor portfolios can also speed propagation 
of individual country shocks to other economies through inves-
tor wealth effects (Kyle and Xiong, 2001; Goldstein and Pauzner, 
2004). A crisis in one country leads to a reduction in the wealth 
of those invested in that country. The decline in wealth causes 
investors to rebalance portfolios, and possibly even to act in a 
more risk-averse manner, so they scale back holdings of risky 
assets in other countries, even when those other countries share 
no ties or risk factors with the original economy in crisis. 
Finally, crises can be transmitted via the real sector, for exam-
ple, through trade ties and competitive (terms-of-trade) effects. 
Shocks affecting developed countries eventually affect developed 
countries’ trade partners. The recent US economic downturn 
resulted in a slowdown in GDP growth and a reduction in 
import demand, adversely affecting many developing economies 
that traditionally exported to the US (Stiglitz, 2010b). Adverse 
exchange rate effects would, in the standard model, be viewed 
as purely redistributive – one country gains what the other coun-
try loses – but with fi nancial constraints, as we have noted, the 
aggregative effect may still be negative (see also Paasche, 2001.)
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In this section we have discussed several alternative theories of 
fi nancial contagion. Of the various theories, the pure contagion 
models are the least plausible. As Stiglitz (1999b) notes, while 
Brazil and Russia had few risk factors in common with Southeast 
Asian economies, both countries saw signifi cant capital fl ight 
in the immediate aftermath of the Asian crisis. Similarly, Brazil 
suffered in the aftermath of the Russian crisis. In those cases, the 
effects arose from fi nancial institutions and hedge funds with 
portfolio exposures to multiple emerging markets both within 
and outside of Asia, and especially from the fi nancial constraints 
faced by those fi rms. More recently, disproportionate contrac-
tions in lending by banks in the crisis-affected countries helped 
spread crises to Eastern Europe and emerging markets. 
Our discussion of the circumstances that precipitate contagion 
and spread of shocks to multiple economies has important policy 
implications for countries with signifi cant international capital 
market linkages, including Ireland, which we discuss in the next 
section. 
Contagion and Financial and Capital Market Liberalisation
Short-Run Exchange Rate Interventions
A standard response to the threat of contagion includes an 
international bailout package, the essential ingredient of which 
is a commitment of large amounts of fi nancial support, some 
of which is used immediately for intervention to support the 
currency, and the rest is left to convince the market that more 
support will be provided, should the need occur. As Stiglitz 
(1999a) has commented, there are two things that are odd about 
these interventions, which often are ineffective (for example, in 
Russia in 1998, in East Asia in 1997 and in Argentina in 2001). 
First, why should a temporary intervention in the market have 
persistent effects? Moreover, if the crisis conveyed information 
about Mexico’s fundamentals that are relevant to Argentina’s 
situation then even if the IMF intervention stabilised Mexico’s 
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exchange rate it would not change market perceptions of the 
underlying weaknesses in Argentina’s economy. Only if market 
participants were naïve enough just to look at the exchange rate 
(the outcome of market processes and intervention) would the 
intervention work.20 And secondly, why should an intervention 
in Mexico have any effect on Argentina? On the contrary, if the 
market thought that intervention was necessary but that inter-
vention on behalf of Argentina was less likely than in the case of 
Mexico, an intervention in Mexico, even if successful in support-
ing the Mexican exchange rate, could have an adverse effect on 
Argentina. 
There are two sets of models in which such temporary inter-
ventions might make sense. The fi rst is in the presence of deep 
market irrationalities – where market participants are truly naïve 
and only look at exchange rates, not what brings them about; 
where they have simple beliefs about contagion – that a crisis in 
one country is like a communicable disease, and if we cure the 
symptoms in one country it can affect its spread to others. The 
other is that there are multiple equilibria, and interventions help 
to move the economy from the ‘bad’ equilibrium to the ‘good’ one. 
A third explanation, which is a variant of the second explanation, 
is that markets are often prone to overshooting and interventions 
are an attempt to prevent that. Given the real consequences of 
overshooting discussed earlier, such interventions may make 
sense. Note that in each of these explanations market processes 
on their own are assumed to lead to sub-optimal outcomes. But 
the advocates of these interventions at the international fi nancial 
institutions, which typically have placed strong confi dence in the 
effi ciency and stability of market processes, need to provide a 
clear delineation of the circumstances in which markets can be 
relied upon and those in which they cannot. Critics might argue 
that in the case of crises the market ineffi ciencies are so large that 
they simply can’t be ignored, but they are likely present at other 
times as well (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1987).
More broadly, however, the models that we have deline-
ated in this paper provide a rationale for such exchange rate 
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interventions. Markets with rational expectations but imperfect 
and asymmetric information are typically not effi cient; even more 
so if markets are subject to irrational pessimism. Then the effects 
of such irrationalities (even if relatively small) can be large and 
persistent; markets may exhibit excessive volatility, and there 
can be real benefi ts to government efforts at stabilisation.
Optimal Financial Architecture
Stiglitz (2000, 2002, 2006, 2010b, 2010c) analyses the optimal 
design of international fi nancial architecture given both the 
benefi ts of fi nancial integration in achieving diversifi cation and 
smoothing of negative consumption shocks and the costs of 
adverse spill-overs across markets due to fi nancial contagion. 
Financial integration raises the overall risk of spill-overs of large 
negative shocks (Stiglitz, 2010c). Stiglitz (2010b) examines the 
trade-off between contagion and diversifi cation associated with 
open capital markets in a risk-sharing context. He shows that 
risk-sharing arrangements can become a negative-sum game in 
the presence of bankruptcy costs and other commonly accepted 
fi nancial market frictions. In the absence of such frictions, diver-
sifi cation achieved through risk-sharing arrangements benefi ts 
risk-averse investors and consumers. However, a number of 
plausible market frictions can set in motion a fi nancial accelerator 
effect that leads the initial shock to gain magnitude and persist. 
With bankruptcy costs, full diversifi cation may result in lower 
aggregate output (net of such costs), so much lower that it more 
than offsets other benefi ts from diversifi cation. Capital market 
integration could increase, instead of lower, the likelihood of a 
fi nancial crisis in a given economy. Even if risk sharing does not 
initially increase the likelihood of a crisis but only increases the 
probability of a near-crisis state, the resulting increase in borrow-
ing costs accounts for trend reinforcement, which raises the odds 
of a crisis in the long run.21
One analogy is with fuller integration of electricity grids, 
which saves on generating capacity but increases the risk of a 
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broader systemic failure. In practice, well-designed electricity 
networks make use of circuit breakers. In international fi nance 
capital controls serve as such circuit breakers. 
If well-designed capital controls could be incorporated to 
prevent contagion during crisis episodes without compromising 
the risk-sharing benefi ts of integration, integration would always 
be preferred. However, designing and implementing such a 
mechanism is very challenging in practice. Therefore, the choice 
of integration depends on the likelihood of a large shock (and 
ensuing systemic failure) relative to the level of country-specifi c 
risk and the costs associated with variability. Moreover, the types 
and severity of informational and other frictions present in differ-
ent countries must be considered for a complete assessment of 
the trade-offs and benefi ts of capital market integration.
In their analysis of the Asian fi nancial crisis, Furman and 
Stiglitz (1998)22 and Stiglitz (2004) argue that while the adverse 
events affecting East Asian economies were at least to some extent 
exogenous (irrational investor perceptions, sudden changes in 
investor willingness to bear risk, interest rate increases in indus-
trialised countries), the rapid liberalisation of capital fl ows and 
integration of domestic markets into global fi nancial markets in 
the absence of a sound bank supervisory and regulatory frame-
work contributed to the severity of the crisis. They fi nd evidence 
that rapid growth in unhedged short-term debt exposures made 
East Asian markets vulnerable to sudden capital outfl ows and 
heightened the magnitude of the subsequent crisis. Moreover, 
fi nancial integration limited the fl exibility of the macroeconomic 
policy response because of the concern that interest rate reduc-
tions would exacerbate capital fl ight. In the aftermath of the Asian 
fi nancial crisis and the Great Recession, the highly volatile, short-
term, speculative nature of international capital movements has 
led many emerging market governments to reconsider the bene-
fi ts of full liberalisation of capital fl ows (Calvo and Mendoza, 
2000). Recently, the IMF has also argued that certain restrictions 
on cross-border capital fl ows may be desirable and included such 
restrictions in some of its recent programmes (e.g. in Iceland).
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Financial liberalisation refers to the opening of a country’s 
fi nancial system to banking institutions (and other fi nancial 
institutions) from abroad. Research conducted before the crisis 
suggested that it provided one mechanism for the spread of a 
crisis from one country to others; as we have noted, the Great 
Recession reinforced these fi ndings. One policy response is to 
question the single market principle, under which a bank that is 
regulated by one jurisdiction is allowed to operate freely in other 
jurisdictions. There is now a growing consensus that countries 
have to regulate all fi nancial institutions operating within their 
jurisdiction (regardless of ownership) and that they should be 
organised as subsidiaries (not branches), to ensure that there was 
adequate capital within the country (United Nations, 2010).
Extensive work on crises and their propagation can be used 
to understand the history of fi nancial crises, to draw inferences 
about the origins and spread of the recent fi nancial crisis, and to 
devise policy frameworks to reduce the occurrence and magni-
tude of future crises. We have identifi ed a number of mechanisms 
leading to crises and their contagion. Most of the plausible mech-
anisms require us to go beyond the standard macroeconomic 
frameworks based on rational agents with rational expecta-
tions operating in well-functioning fi nancial markets. What is 
needed now is a comprehensive model that integrates various 
crisis transmission channels and provides a coherent set of policy 
recommendations both to reduce the magnitude and frequency 
of shocks, to stem contagion and to respond to the crises that 
nonetheless occur. 
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Endnotes
1 The authors thank Charles Larkin, Brian Lucey and Constantin Gurdgiev 
for their helpful suggestions.
2 As we note below, this was a mistake, which is not uncommon in the 
presence of supervisory failures. 
3 There were major institutional fl aws in the design of NAMA which under-
mined its ability to fulfi l its mission. These are not the subject of this 
paper. 
4 We say typically because there are exceptions: in the Great Recession, 
though precipitated by the US banking crisis, the US appeared to be a 
safe haven, and its exchange rate appreciated. The subsequent low inter-
est rates and depressed wages helped (at least temporarily) to buoy stock 
market prices, even though economic activity languished.
5 That this is not so in general—that markets with even large numbers of 
well-informed participants may look markedly diff erent from those in 
which all are well informed—is one of the central messages of Salop and 
Stiglitz (1976). Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) showed that uninformed 
market participants could extract some, but not all, of the information 
from the prices generated by informed traders. 
6 The essential insight was that with an overvalued exchange rate the coun-
try would generate a trade defi cit, which foreign exchange reserves could 
only fi nance for a limited amount of time. Of course, if markets antici-
pated this, with rational expectations, the crisis would occur well before 
foreign exchange reserves were fi nally exhausted.
7 There is some evidence that normal trade adjustments, spurred in part by 
devaluation, were central to the resolution of the crisis; the bail-out, by 
temporarily leading to an exchange rate that was higher than it otherwise 
would have been, may in fact have impeded adjustment. 
8 In these models, there is no way that market participants can anticipate 
when the economy might shift from one equilibrium to another.
9 See also the earlier work of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Greenwald, 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1984).
10 Either because managers are forced to bear some risk, as part of optimal 
incentive contracts, or because of bankruptcy costs. See Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (1990).
11 Moreover, the value of fi rm equity can change rapidly, and there may be 
many claimants. 
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12 Similarly, Miller and Stiglitz (2010) use a model with collateral require-
ments to demonstrate how shocks can turn into crises in the presence of 
high leverage and overvalued assets. 
13 More recent research has emphasised that individuals discount informa-
tion that is inconsistent with their priors, and overweight information 
that is consistent. If a bubble is forming, they tend to weigh more heavily 
the information that is consistent with their beliefs. There can be equilib-
rium frictions, where they ‘rationally’ believe that there is a bubble (see 
Hoff  and Stiglitz, 2010).
14 Traditional economic theory – and economic policy – has taken ambigu-
ous positions about these destabilising adjustments. It has been standard 
fare to worry about ‘overshooting’. Excessive exchange rate adjustments, 
it is thought, impede the adjustment of the market economy to the new 
(or ‘correct’) equilibrium, and this provides justifi cation for interventions 
to reduce the magnitude of the exchange rate adjustment. In some cases, 
there is evidence that such interventions actually impede the adjustment 
process. Indeed, one set of studies suggests that it was the normal foreign 
exchange adjustment mechanism which restored Mexico’s growth, and 
that attempts to dampen the foreign exchange correction (driven by 
concerns about impact on foreign creditors) slowed down adjustment. In 
particular, if there had been larger foreign exchange adjustments accom-
panied by debt restructuring, the economy arguably would have recovered 
more quickly (Lederman, Menendez, Perry and Stiglitz, 2001, 2003).
15 Standard macro theories are of two minds about the role of wage and 
price rigidities. While the Hicksian IS-LM tradition focuses on wage and 
price rigidities, the Fisherian tradition revived by Greenwald and Stiglitz 
(1993a, 1993b, and the articles cited there) emphasises that with imper-
fectly indexed debt contracts wage fl exibility may exacerbate economic 
downturns. In a model where both wages and prices are fl exible, but 
imperfectly so, the economy can have sustained unemployment (see 
Solow and Stiglitz, 1968).
16 Although many sources mention contagion, no consensus has emerged 
on the precise defi nition of contagion (see, for example, Gallegati, Green-
wald, Richiardi and Stiglitz, 2008). In the broadest sense, contagion 
involves spill-overs of economic events from one country to other coun-
tries (or, in the context of lending, from one borrower to other borrowers). 
A narrower view, more specifi c to crisis episodes, defi nes contagion as 
an increase in correlations among two countries in bad times or, in the 
words of Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000, p. 178), ‘a signifi cant 
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increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to an individual country, 
as measured by the degree to which asset prices or fi nancial fl ows move 
together across markets relative to this co-movement in tranquil time.’
17 Bank decisions in anticipation of contagion can increase the level of 
systemic risk. For example, Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) consider the 
lending decisions of banks aff ected by common as well as idiosyncratic 
shocks. If one bank fails, investors update their assessment of other banks. 
Investors are unable to tell if the bank failed for bank-specifi c or systemic 
reasons, so they become more reluctant to invest in the remaining banks. 
Anticipating such investor actions, banks try to minimise unfavourable 
information spill-overs of bank failures by investing in more highly corre-
lated loans. Thus, the expectation of contagion causes banks to herd, 
which aggravates systemic risk and the magnitude of contagion occur-
ring ex post. Nalebuff  and Stiglitz (1983) examine the role of incentive 
confl icts in explaining herding.
18 See, for instance, Radner and Stiglitz (1984).
19 The general theory is set forth in Korinek (2008).
20 Alternatively, if contagion occurred through ‘real’ channels – Mexican 
purchases of Argentinean goods were enhanced as a result of exchange 
rate support, because real balance eff ects are more important than rela-
tive price eff ects – then the Mexican intervention could reduce spill-over 
eff ects. These eff ects did not play an important role in the discussions 
preceding most of the bailouts. 
21 Stiglitz (2010c) uses a life cycle model to show that capital market liberali-
sation may actually reduce the scope for inter-temporal risk sharing, and 
thus lower the long-term present discounted value of expected utility. 
22 After each crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, policy makers identifi ed a factor 
that seemed to be pivotal as the source of a crisis: an overvalued exchange 
rate, excessive public indebtedness, insuffi  cient private savings, lack 
of transparency. But the analysis was ad hoc and had little predictive 
power. Mexico’s problems in 1994 were markedly diff erent from those of 
Latin America in the early 1980s. East Asian countries had high savings 
rates and low public indebtedness. The last set of countries to suff er 
from a fi nancial crisis before the East Asian crisis were those of Scan-
dinavia, generally viewed as the most transparent in the world. Furman 
and Stiglitz (1998) attempt to identify econometrically the factors that 
contribute to an economy’s vulnerability to a fi nancial crisis. Needless 
to say, their results confi rm the lack of predictive power of the standard 
explanations of vulnerability to a crisis.
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